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CIT IZENS FOR EISENHOWER AND
THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, –*
ROBERT MA SON
University of Edinburgh
A B S T R AC T . Founded in support of Dwight D. Eisenhower’s  presidential candidacy, Citizens
for Eisenhower took on an ambitious mission to revitalize the Republican party by expanding its
activist ranks and by supporting the moderation of its conservative policy agenda. The organization
proved unable to sustain the impressive momentum that it achieved during the  campaign,
however, instead helping to fuel factional opposition that informed the intraparty upsurge of
conservatism during the s and afterwards. The Eisenhower administration’s efforts to
encourage Citizens activists to join the party were ﬂawed, and existing Republican activists often
viewed such newcomers with hostility. More signiﬁcantly, despite recruitment initiatives, in most cases
activism in support of Eisenhower did not translate into enthusiasm for the party cause. The history of
Citizens for Eisenhower therefore demonstrates the seriousness of Eisenhower’s interests as president in
boosting the Republican party’s fortunes, but also the shortcomings of ‘amateur’ political activity in
support of the party cause. It also sheds light on goals and activities of this era’s moderate
Republicans, together with their role in fostering the conservative resurgence that characterized the
post-Eisenhower Republican party.
Citizens for Eisenhower was an extra-party, candidate-centred organization
associated with the Republican party during the s and early s.
It emerged in support of Dwight D. Eisenhower’s  presidential candidacy;
Eisenhower’s personal popularity remained the foundation of the Citizens
organization. The activism that Eisenhower inspired achieved unique strength
in twentieth-century US politics by bringing the organization a membership
of some two million Americans at the height of the  campaign, and in
* For helpful advice in response to earlier versions of this article, I am grateful to Jonathan
Bell, Iwan Morgan, Byron Shafer, Elizabeth Tandy Shermer, David Stebenne, the anonymous
reviewers for the journal, the journal’s editors, and the participants in an Institute of Historical
Research seminar of February . The article draws on research conducted with support
from the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland and the Eisenhower Foundation, for
which I am also grateful.
 On Eisenhower’s popularity as a politician, see Herbert H. Hyman and Paul B. Sheatsley,
‘The political appeal of President Eisenhower’, Public Opinion Quarterly,  (–),
pp. –.
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remaining a signiﬁcant electoral force throughout Eisenhower’s time in the
White House; no other personally focused political organization had success at
such a scale. The cause, furthermore, involved the party as well as a political
personality; it ﬁrst involved a desire to take Eisenhower to the White House, but
subsequently extended to a larger goal: that to support the reshaping of the
Republican party according to Eisenhower’s image, though this extension
proved problematic to pursue. In the words of Peter Clayton, a leader of
Citizens for Eisenhower, the organization needed ‘to translate the enthusiasm
which the Eisenhower name has created into a bigger, richer, Republican Party
with a Republican President and a Republican Congress in ofﬁce long after
Eisenhower leaves ofﬁce’. The Republican party still languished in minority status,
as it had done since the arrival of the Great Depression two decades earlier; the
mission that Citizens assumed was to challenge that minority status as well as to
secure presidential victories for Eisenhower. This article investigates the
organization’s activities and its impact.
The novelty of Citizens for Eisenhower does not involve its institutional
character as a candidate-centred political organization connected with but also
separate from a political party. In the s, this kind of organization was by
no means unusual in the United States; indeed, limitations on an individual
campaign committee’s spending encouraged the existence of such entities.
What was unusual was, ﬁrst, the extent of Eisenhower’s popularity on which the
organization was based, and, second, the degree of institutional permanence
that Citizens for Eisenhower achieved, which was connected with the larger goal
of party revitalization that Peter Clayton outlined.
I
Despite the strength of its grassroots organization and despite the boldness
of its goals, Citizens for Eisenhower has attracted little scholarly attention.
By contrast, historians have extensively studied conservative activism at the
grassroots during this period, especially associated with the Goldwater move-
ment of the s. This research underscores the signiﬁcance of such political
endeavour in explaining the rightward turn that took hold in US politics during
the s. On the whole, however, insufﬁcient attention has been paid to this
era’s liberal and moderate Republicans – those politicians and activists whose
 Clayton to unknown,  June , Abilene, Kansas, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library
(DDEL), Thomas E. Stephens records, box .
 Hall to Roberts,  Sept. , West Branch, Iowa, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library,
Thayer papers, political ﬁles, box .
 For James Q. Wilson, a contemporary scholar of political ‘amateurs’, the era’s most
outstanding example of this amateur spirit in politics was the Goldwater movement within the
Republican party. James Q. Wilson, The amateur Democrat (; Chicago, IL, ), pp. viii–ix.
 Donald T. Critchlow, The conservative ascendancy: how the GOP Right made political history
(Cambridge, MA, ); Lisa McGirr, Suburban warriors: the origins of the new American Right
(Princeton, NJ, ).
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inﬂuence both within and beyond the party experienced long-term decline as
conservatives made political progress.
Moderate Republicans differed from their conservative counterparts in more
readily accepting an expanded government role in tackling socio-economic ills;
they differed from most Democrats not only with the argument that their
custody of government was more managerially efﬁcient and less ﬁnancially
wasteful, but also with a greater preference for non-Washington solutions to
those socio-economic ills and with a stronger stress on ﬁscal conservatism.
Shortly after his  re-election, Eisenhower spoke of ‘the responsibility of the
Federal Government to take the lead in making certain that the productivity of
our great economic machine is distributed so that no one will suffer disaster,
privation, through no fault of his own’, a responsibility encompassing ‘the wide
ﬁeld of education and health, and so on’. Free enterprise and decentralization
nevertheless remained important principles in this moderate vision. ‘While I
have recognized the necessity of the Federal government undertaking functions
and responsibilities that far exceed those in which it was engaged forty years
ago, yet I have consistently fought against the needless and useless expansion of
these functions and responsibilities’, he wrote in . ‘We believe in sound
ﬁscal policies for the government, thereby helping to combat inﬂation and to
preserve the purchasing power of the working man’s savings.’ This moderate
Republican agenda involved ‘essentially conservative principles applied to
th century conditions’, according to the president. Eisenhower’s intraparty
opponents, however, saw the agenda as inadequately conservative. Complaining
in  that ‘the Republican Party in many instances had adopted a course of
action following the policies of the New Deal – Fair Deal’, Midwestern business-
man Loren M. Berry asked, ‘What has happened to the Republican Party of
sound money, balanced budgets, minimum of public debt, low taxes, protective
tariff, competitive private enterprise, states rights and strict adherence to the
 Exceptions include Sara Fitzgerald, Elly Peterson: ‘mother’ of the moderates (Ann Arbor, MI,
), Geoffrey Kabaservice, Rule and ruin: the downfall of moderation and the destruction of the
Republican party, from Eisenhower to the Tea Party (New York, NY, ), David Stebenne, Modern
Republican: Arthur Larson and the Eisenhower years (Bloomington, IN, ), Nicol C. Rae, The
decline and fall of the liberal Republicans: from  to the present (New York, NY, ), and Richard
Norton Smith, Thomas E. Dewey and his times (New York, NY, ). Where scholars have
investigated liberal and moderate Republicans, their emphasis has generally remained at the
elite level. A book that looks at the conﬂict between conservatives and non-conservatives within
the party, encompassing activists, is Michael Bowen, The roots of modern conservatism: Dewey, Taft,
and the battle for the soul of the Republican party (Chapel Hill, NC, ).
 Notes of press conference,  Nov. , DDEL, Dwight D. Eisenhower Records as
President: White House Central Files, Ofﬁcial ﬁle, box .
 Eisenhower to Alcorn,  Aug. , DDEL, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President of
the United States (DDEPP), Administration series, box . Acceptance of government activism
also led to support for infrastructural development, notably including the  act to fund
interstate highways.
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Constitution?’ Although Eisenhower believed that ﬁscal conservatism created
common ground among Republicans, differences about the GOP (‘Grand
Old Party’ or Republican party) response to ‘big government’ created intense
conﬂict between party moderates and conservatives. Differences extended to
foreign policy as well as domestic policy; in , Eisenhower’s belief that
Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio, the leading conservative Republican candidate
for the party’s presidential nomination, inadequately supported Cold War
systems of international co-operation (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
in particular) spurred his decision to enter party politics. During his time in
ofﬁce, the anti-internationalism that offended Eisenhower subsided within the
party, but some conservative–moderate distinctions remained, with foreign aid,
for example, a notable focus for disagreement.
The history of Citizens for Eisenhower – in large part an effort to promote
moderate Republicanism –merits study for a number of reasons. First, the
neglect of non-conservative Republicans narrows our understanding of how the
GOP responded to Democratic electoral dominance and New Deal liberalism
during this period. To many in the party, it seemed that ﬁdelity to conservative
principle was likely to magnify the party’s problems, rather than provide any
opportunity to achieve a comeback; such a belief usually guided the activism of
Citizens. As Timothy Thurber has shown, even after the Goldwater candidacy of
 conservatism’s opponents remained more powerful in party circles than is
generally appreciated. Second, one of the main crucibles for the development
of modern American conservatism was within the Republican party itself, within
a bitter debate between those who advocated a stress on conservative rejection
of New Deal liberalism and those who preferred accommodationism. Historical
analysis of Citizens for Eisenhower not only sheds light on the signiﬁcance of
moderate activism within the Republican party, but also aids understanding
of how conservative activists gained strength during the s and beyond
through counter-mobilization against its inﬂuence. An additional signiﬁcance
of Citizens for Eisenhower is the window it offers on concern among
Republicans about their party’s organizational capacity that many among
them deemed essential for GOP electoral success. Finally, the movement sheds
light on contemporary anxiety about the health of American democracy and
the efforts of activists to revitalize engagement and participation in politics.
Although historians have neglected the study of Citizens, the organization
itself and the larger trend in party politics that it represented seemed important
 Berry to Alcorn,  Jan. , Bloomington, Indiana, Lilly Library, Indiana University,
Charles A. Halleck papers, box .
 William B. Pickett, Eisenhower decides to run: presidential politics and Cold War strategy
(Chicago, IL, ).
 Robert Mason, The Republican party and American politics from Hoover to Reagan (New York,
NY, ), pp. –, , –.
 Timothy N. Thurber, ‘Goldwaterism triumphant? Race and the Republican party,
–’, Journal of the Historical Society,  (), pp. –.
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to the era’s social scientists and political actors. In , political scientist James
Q. Wilson published The amateur Democrat, a book about a current phenomenon
in grassroots politics that Wilson identiﬁed as important – new forms of activism
that were emerging in the political parties. Offering a study of the reform-
oriented urban club movement in the Democratic party, the book outlined
a distinction between ‘professionals’ and ‘amateurs’ among political activists.
Professionals were primarily interested in winning, and they found motivation
for political engagement in the tangible rewards of activism – inﬂuence and
power. Amateurs, by contrast, rejected such self-interest as an inadequate
approach to party politics, caring about a cause instead of victory, about issues
instead of patronage. For amateurs, ‘principle, rather than interest, ought to be
the motive of political action’, Wilson wrote. At ﬁrst sight, the amateurs’
commitment to principle is more appealing than the professionals’ straight-
forward interest in seeking ‘majorities for whatever candidates and programs
seem best suited to capturing public fancy’. But for Wilson, their dedication to
a particular cause formed a ﬂimsy foundation for effective politics because
it undermined the likelihood of long-term investment in the necessary work
of party politics. It also militated against compromise, thereby sapping the
prospect of coalition-building, both within the party and among voters, that was
an essential element of mid-twentieth-century American politics. Such
criticisms anticipated later analyses of the Democratic party; when a new
breed of issue-oriented activists – the inheritors of the amateur spirit – became
inﬂuential at the national level, especially in the aftermath of the McGovern–
Fraser party reforms of the early s, some saw their inﬂuence as attacking
the party’s ability to build a majority coalition.
According to Stephen A. Mitchell, Democratic national chair during the
s, the Republican counterpart to his party’s urban clubs was Citizens
for Eisenhower. Mitchell posited the comparison on the grounds that the
memberships of both organizations prioritized policy objectives and good
government ahead of party concerns. Driven by principle rather than by
patronage, they engaged with issues in a political style that fostered wide-
ranging debate and effective outreach to the community. Writing in ,
Mitchell argued that ‘the old is characterized by exclusiveness, a minimum
of party activity, and an absence of democratic procedures; the new is
characterized by expansionism and independence which may approach the
evangelical, greater activity, and a devotion to democratic procedures’.
 Wilson, Amateur Democrat, passim.
 Over time, the organization’s ofﬁcial name was subject to change – adding Nixon to the
title, for example, on Richard Nixon’s vice-presidential selection. At the national level,
variations included the Citizens for Eisenhower Congressional Committee (in ) and the
National Citizens for Eisenhower-Nixon  Committee. Informally, however, the group
remained known as Citizens for Eisenhower throughout the period.
 Stephen A. Mitchell, Elm Street politics (New York, NY, ), p. . In longer-term
perspective, the clubs exercised a greater inﬂuence on the Democrats’ policy direction.
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Whereas Wilson disparaged this new form of activism, Mitchell saw it as a
revitalizing force in party politics.
As the s ascendancy of conservatism within the Republican party
signiﬁes, the Citizens challenge to professional Republicans of the s did
not end in victory. Eisenhower’s popularity was sufﬁcient to win the presidency,
but not to effect any larger transformation of the GOP. The mobilization of
Eisenhower activists in support of ‘modern Republicanism’ did succeed in
scoring a few gains, but its larger impact involved the encouragement of a
conservative counter-mobilization that went on to reshape the party in the
s – a different form of political amateurism. The paradox of the Citizens
project is that what began in – as a mass movement to achieve a popular
transformation of the Republican party ended, more than a decade later, as an
elite-based effort to hold back the rise of Goldwater-led and grassroots-driven
conservatism. The results of this enterprise lend support to Wilson’s sceptical
evaluation of amateurs in politics, that the instability of their political
engagement and its lack of realism reduced the prospect that they would
exercise signiﬁcant inﬂuence. The success of the Goldwater movement in
promoting conservatism within the Republican party nevertheless suggests that
amateur endeavour was not inescapably volatile in this way; the contrast
between Citizens and the Goldwater movement, eventually, is that too many
members of the former did not move beyond personality to embrace a party
cause, while for the latter, support of Goldwater was a way to pursue a larger,
party-modifying goal.
As Daniel Galvin has recently argued, Eisenhower identiﬁed the revitalization
of the Republican party as a key goal of his presidency, despite the belief of
many contemporaries and scholars that he neglected the party to concentrate
on his personal fortunes. Eisenhower saw the party’s revitalization as
dependent on two developments. First, the party needed to become less
conservative. ‘If we could get every Republican committed as a Moderate
Progressive’, Eisenhower told his friend Clifford Roberts, who played a leading
role in Citizens, ‘the Party would grow so rapidly that within a few years it would
dominate American politics.’ Administration analysis suggested that indepen-
dent or swing voters, crucial in deciding elections, were moderates rather than
conservatives. ‘From the standpoint of winning elections’, concluded one aide
in reviewing poll data, ‘there is little doubt that the moderate pro-Eisenhower
wing has a much broader base of appeal than the traditional right-wing
Jonathan Bell, ‘Building a Left coast: the legacy of the California Popular Front and the
challenge to Cold War liberalism in the post-World War II era’, Journal of American Studies, 
(), pp. –.
 Daniel Galvin, Presidential party building: Dwight D. Eisenhower to George W. Bush (Princeton,
NJ, ), pp. –. See also Cornelius P. Cotter, ‘Eisenhower as party leader’, Political Science
Quarterly,  (), pp. –.
 Eisenhower to Roberts,  Dec. , DDEL, DDEPP, DDE Diary series, box .
 RO B E R T M A S ON
Republican group.’ This perspective helped to inform a project of modern
Republicanism, rooted in the moderates’ vision for the party, and seeking
a ‘middle-way’ balance between a conservative wariness of an expansive
federal government and a much less conservative acceptance of programmatic
innovation to tackle socio-economic ills. Second, in Eisenhower’s assessment
an expanded group of activists would also help the GOP in pursuing the
essential goal ‘[to] organize itself far better than it has in the past, particularly at
the precinct, district and county levels’. To this end, he hoped that Citizens
could be ‘a recruiting establishment for the Republicans’.
For Eisenhower, the two goals necessarily went hand in hand; his central
insight in encouraging Citizens emphasized the importance of grassroots
strength to secure political change. In contemplating the transformation of the
Republican party, he recognized the futility of a reliance on elite-level policy
initiatives alone. ‘[T]o be a strong and effective organization’, he observed in
, ‘such a movement almost of necessity must be of grass roots origin.
It cannot possibly be inspired “from the top,” so to speak.’ In his estimate,
the Citizens organization was a way to share his own formidable popularity
with the party at large via a bottom-up, rather than top-down, impetus. The
organization’s mission, as explained to leading Republicans in the run-up to
the  re-election bid, was ‘[t]o identify in the minds of Americans the
Eisenhower program and the Republican program as one and the same’, and
‘[t]o provide a co-ordinated program for those people who want to support Ike,
but who are not yet willing to be active Republicans’.
I I
The amateur, bottom-up nature of Citizens was evident at the organization’s
birth. The prospect of an Eisenhower presidential candidacy had inspired
grassroots activism before  and returned in a more signiﬁcant form as the
 elections approached. Two New Jersey businesspeople, Charles F. Willis
and Stanley Rumbough, established the Citizens organization in  in
order to foster the creation of Eisenhower clubs nationwide. The new group
participated in the successful effort to persuade Eisenhower to return from his
North Atlantic Treaty Organization duties in Europe in order to run for
president. By the time Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr, of Massachusetts, a
leading ﬁgure in the draft-Eisenhower effort, invited Willis and Rumbough to
make it the volunteer arm of Eisenhower’s campaign for the nomination, the
 Masterson to Pyle,  May , DDEL, Howard Pyle records, box .
 Stebenne, Modern Republican; Steven F. Wagner, Eisenhower Republicanism: pursuing the
middle way (DeKalb, IL, ).
 Eisenhower to Paley,  Nov. , DDEPP, Name series, box .
 Eisenhower and Bridges transcript,  May , DDEPP, DDE Diary series, box .
 Eisenhower to Baker and Baker,  Aug. , DDEPP, DDE Diary series, box .
 RNC to leading Republicans, n.d., DDEPP, Campaign series, box .
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Citizens movement had become a network of some  clubs under  state
chairs. Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr, its new chair, deﬁned the organization’s
purpose as being ‘to consolidate mass sentiment for the general’. Drawing on
enthusiasm for Eisenhower, Citizens counted a membership of , in
some , clubs by the end of ’s bitterly factional and ﬁercely contested
GOP nomination struggle. Many credited the organization with an essential
role in the victory of its champion over Senator Robert A. Taft, hero of
conservative Republicans – ‘Mr. Republican’.
As soon as Lodge made Citizens the volunteer arm of the Eisenhower
campaign, however, the movement lost some of its amateurism. An elite group
of Eisenhower associates now provided it with technical expertise, notably
involving television, and organizational advice. Despite Citizens’ public
reputation as a grassroots political force, therefore, the nature of the behind-
the-scenes leadership qualiﬁed the meaning of this amateurism; there was
‘professionalism’ behind the amateurism. With fatal consequences for the
fortunes of the Citizens project, the elite component became more important
and the mass component less important over time. In , however, the
grassroots strength of Citizens was powerful enough to encourage the belief that
it might change the larger fortunes of the Republican party and perhaps
transform the nature of party politics.
Despite this professional dimension, the Citizens movement always asserted
its essentially amateur nature. Like Wilson’s ‘amateur Democrats’, the
organization aimed to promote a different form of political engagement –more
high-minded, less self-interested than that practised by the more traditional
breed of party workers. Its activists proudly differentiated themselves from the
party professionals. According to Clifford Roberts, writing in , theirs was
‘a name under which all the mavericks can gather’. When Eisenhower spoke
to a Citizens audience during the  campaign, he praised this spirit of
amateurism as embodying ‘honesty, integrity and decency in government’,
even comparing it with the zeal that Oliver Cromwell had inspired among
 Jane Dick, Volunteers and the making of presidents (New York, NY, ), p. .
 New York Times (NYT),  Feb. , p. .
 Saturday Evening Post,  Sept. , p. ; Leonard W. Hall, foreword, in Mitchell, Elm
Street politics, p. i; Dick, Volunteers, p. ; NYT,  Aug. , p. . For a rich, detailed exploration
of Eisenhower’s nomination quest, see Paul T. David, Malcolm Moos, and Ralph M. Goldman,
eds., Presidential nominating politics in  (Baltimore, MD, ).
 Those with close links to regular Republican activity retained a distance from Citizens,
seeking not to undermine that volunteer identity. Herbert Brownell with John P. Burke,
Advising Ike: the memoirs of Attorney General Herbert Brownell (Lawrence, KS, ), p. ;
Robert F. Burk, Dwight D. Eisenhower: hero and politician (Boston, MA, ), p. ; Craig Allen,
Eisenhower and the mass media: peace, prosperity, and prime-time TV (Chapel Hill, NC, ),
pp. –, –, –.
 NYT,  Jan. , p. E.
 Roberts to Hall,  June , DDEPP, Name series, box .
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his followers. The cause of ‘good government’ was one that Citizens for
Eisenhower identiﬁed with its agenda and employed as a rationale for activism
in support of the Eisenhower administration.
Contemporary media characterizations of the Citizens also played on the
amateur tag. According to one reporter, the organization was youthful, fresh,
and vigorous, but also ‘a burr in the pants of the regulars’. Another noted that
regulars saw them as ‘much too modern in their modern Republicanism’. In
an unﬂattering allusion, journalist George Creel described Citizens in  as
‘rank amateurs who want to run their own show’. In common with a Democrats
for Eisenhower organization that operated in his home city of San Francisco,
it was ‘a Mexican army; all generals and no privates’.
The amateurs’ distinctiveness had a gender dimension. The grassroots
nature of Citizens for Eisenhower ensured that the organization drew
signiﬁcantly on the contribution of women. ‘The women are being counted
on to do heavy work for the Eisenhower cause’, a journalist reported during the
 campaign. The world of party politics was one where women possessed
little decision-making power, but they were responsible for much of the
essential work of grassroots organization. The era’s male Republican leaders
consequently recognized that the expansion of the party’s activist base
depended on women, even though they continued to exclude women from
most leadership roles. The less established and more ﬂuid structures of the
Citizens movement, as well as its emphasis on grassroots organization, seem to
have created new opportunities for women to participate in politics. Evidence
suggests that in many areas women provided much of the vitality within the
local Citizens organization. Furthermore, the target of much Citizens
activity was an audience of women, creating an arena of political debate
and activism for women. Just as women played an important role in the
 NYT,  Sept. , p. .
 Citizens for Eisenhower pamphlet, n.d., Yorba Linda, California, Richard Nixon Library
and Museum, Richard Nixon papers, series , box ; Houghton to Nixon,  Apr. ,
Nixon papers, series , box ; Los Angeles Times clipping,  Sept. , Nixon papers,
series , box . Houghton urged the use of the good-government rationale as a way to
encourage Citizens to join the Republican party.
 Corpus Christi (TX) Caller-Times,  Aug. , p. .
 Connellsville, PA, Daily Courier,  June , p. .
 Creel to Nixon,  Oct. , Nixon papers, PPS ..
 Danville, VA, Bee,  Sept. , p. .
 Paula Baker, ‘“She is the best man on the ward committee”: women in grassroots party
organizations, s–s’, in Melanie Gustafson, Kristie Miller, and Elisabeth I. Perry, eds.,
We have come to stay: American women and political parties, – (Albuquerque, NM, ),
pp. –.
 For example, Citizens leader Clifford Roberts concluded that women sometimes made an
important difference to the organization’s success in , noting that ‘in some states, the
woman Co-Chairman is doing work that in part makes up for the weak [male] Chairman’.
Roberts to Nixon,  Oct. , Nixon papers, series , box .
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conservative world of s Orange County portrayed by Lisa McGirr, they
were also therefore a critical element in the activism of s moderate
Republicans.
Citizens sought to extend the reach of political organization by adopting a
domestic focus. As well as coffee meetings, Citizens promoted a signature
version of supper-hour political meetings in people’s homes by offering a recipe
for Eisenhower beef stew, exemplifying the inclusive mass activism that the
organization sought, by reaching out to individuals and by taking political
discussion into neighbourhoods and households. ‘We want to reach into every
home to talk about our great President . . . his team and the vital issues which
are at stake’, Citizens leaders wrote to activists in , in explaining the
rationale for such events. On one day alone in Los Angeles County during
that campaign, activists staged about two thousand coffee hours. Activists in
the packing-house area of Omaha, Nebraska, reported two thousand requests
for the stew recipe.
If amateur enthusiasm made Citizens for Eisenhower a promising and
innovative political force, tensions with professionals or regulars constituted an
obstacle to the fulﬁlment of its potential. Republican factionalism suffused the
emergence of Citizens. Despite the enthusiasm he elicited from the amateurs,
Eisenhower was also the candidate of the ‘Deweyite’ regulars against their
‘Taftite’ counterparts. The connections between Citizens and moderate
Republicans ensured them the enmity of the conservative regulars, which
proved a durable obstacle to the achievement of the Eisenhower project.
In  Eisenhower noted that there was ‘so much resentment’ within the party
because, he recognized, he was ‘forced down the throats of a lot of people in
’’.He similarly recognized that tensions between Citizens and regulars were
likely at the local level.One activist observed that factional tensions were likely
to be yet more acute in marginal districts, though most in need of Citizens help,
because ‘the established Republican Party leadership in a marginal district,
aware of its precarious position, is apt to become hypersensitive, jealous of its
prerogatives and suspicious of outsiders’.
 Citizens for Eisenhower, ‘Advance’,  May , and Citizens for Eisenhower-Nixon,
‘Crusader’,  June , Nixon papers, series , box ; McGirr, Suburban warriors.
 Time,  June .
 Citizens campaign material, n.d., Nixon papers, series , box .
 Report on Southern California,  Sept. , Nixon papers, series , box .
 Report on Nebraska,  Oct. , Nixon papers, series , box .
 The Deweyites were those associated during the s and early s with support for
the moderate agenda of New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey; during the same period, the
Taftites preferred Dewey’s conservative rival for party dominance, Ohio Senator Robert A. Taft.
 Hugh A. Bone, Party committees and national politics (Seattle, WA, ), p. .
 Notes,  May , DDEPP, DDE Diary series, box .
 Minutes,  July , DDEPP, DDE Diary series, box .
 Unknown to Kilpatrick,  Feb. , Stephens records, box .
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At ﬁrst, Citizens enjoyed success in challenging the regulars. Its grassroots
strength gave Citizens an early victory in a crucial struggle with the professionals
of the Republican National Committee (RNC). With the nomination secured,
Eisenhower looked to promote party harmony in order to run an effective
campaign against Adlai Stevenson, his Democratic rival for the presidency.
Leading members of the national committee tried to use this moment to assert
the RNC’s dominance over the amateur group, but they found themselves
thwarted. During the campaign, the Citizens had a status equal to that of the
national committee, with important responsibilities. The RNC was tasked with
mobilizing Republicans, Citizens with doing the same for Democrats and
independents – arguably a more important role in light of the GOP’s minority
status. Moreover, the Citizens victory involved strategy as well as organization.
Citizens leaders defeated the assumptions of the RNC strategy that called for
the mobilization of a ‘stay-at-home’ vote of conservatives. Instead, the campaign
embraced the Citizens belief that the party needed to fashion an appeal to
disaffected Democrats and to independents who were moderate and not
conservative, though of course without alienating Taft enthusiasts. This was
a moment of amateur success in challenging the professionals’ power, in
elevating the role of the candidate’s personal organization at the party’s
expense.
After Eisenhower’s victory in , any larger success for the Citizens project
depended on the achievement of what leading activists labelled integration;
it depended on the decision of Citizens activists to join the Republican party in
order to boost its organizational capacity, to advocate moderation in party
channels, and to promote ideals of good government via enhanced partici-
pation in politics. Citizens leaders consequently promoted this integration.
After the  elections, Walter Williams urged Citizens members to keep their
movement’s ‘spirit’ alive ‘by infusion of that “spirit” in the form of people – live,
pulsating, forward-looking Citizens – into the Republican Party’. Williams
recognized the challenges that the goal involved, however; asked by reporters
whether Citizens could straightforwardly join the party, Williams answered,
‘Impossible.’ The issue was one of degree: the extent to which Citizens
activists would join the party and therefore change it.
The way in which the White House followed up Williams’s rhetorical
ﬂourishes was imperfect, thus failing to maximize the potential of the
integration goal. To be sure, Charles F. Willis, a Citizens leader who joined
 NYT,  July , pp. , ; NYT,  July , pp. E–E; NYT,  July , p. ; Harold
Lavine, ed., Smoke-ﬁlled rooms: the conﬁdential papers of Robert Humphreys (Englewood Cliffs, NJ,
), pp. –; Herbert S. Parmet, Eisenhower and the American crusades (New York, NY,
), p. .
 Williams to Citizens members,  Dec. , Nixon papers, series , box .
 Time,  Nov. .
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the White House as an assistant to chief of staff Sherman Adams, looked
after the sensitive area of patronage matters and promoted the integration
of Citizens with the national committee as a way to diffuse Eisenhower
Republicanism throughout the party. However, it was only in the aftermath of
the disappointing  midterm elections – when the Republicans lost control
of the House and the Senate – that mechanisms were put in place to achieve
such integration between Citizens and the party, identiﬁed then by national
chair Leonard Hall as key in tackling the party’s problems. These measures
included the assignment of Clancy Adamy, another Citizens leader, to the RNC
as Chairman’s Consultant on Enrollment of New Republicans and the creation
of an advisory board that featured other leading members of the organization.
Later, after Eisenhower’s re-election, Hall’s successor as Republican national
chair, Meade Alcorn, who had chaired Citizens in Connecticut in , was
ﬁrmly identiﬁed as an ‘Eisenhower type’. Alcorn’s appointment was part of
larger efforts to place strong Eisenhower supporters in party ofﬁces, ‘to give it a
strong Eisenhower family resemblance’, in the words of one journalist.
The quest for integration had some success in working effectively in some
localities as a conduit for moderate attacks on conservative leadership at the
party’s grassroots. By , this progress was enough to encourage
conﬁdence among Eisenhower supporters that forces in favour of modern
Republicanism controlled the party. Eisenhower was, according to one report,
‘slowly reshaping his party . . . quietly, without hullabaloo’, as his supporters
weakened conservative control of the party at the local level. Trying to
persuade Eisenhower to seek a second term, Leonard Hall assured him that the
party organization ‘was beginning to be rid of the old moss backs which
hampered it so long’, and that another four years of Eisenhower leadership
were sure to complete the task of transformation.
Any such success was incomplete and transient, however. More often, activist
interest in Eisenhower did not easily transfer to interest in the party at large.
Private analyses did not share the public optimism about the fortunes of the
Eisenhower project for party revitalization. ‘The Republican Party has been
unsuccessful during the past three and a half years in transferring the
Eisenhower popularity to Republican party popularity’, noted Sigurd Larmon,
chair of advertising agency Young & Rubicam and a leading ﬁgure in Citizens,
 Cotter, ‘Eisenhower as party leader’, pp. –.
 Hall to Eisenhower,  June , Dwight D. Eisenhower Records as President: White
House Central Files, Ofﬁcial ﬁle, box . On Eisenhower’s increasing attention to political
matters at this time: Life,  Feb. , p. .  NYT,  Jan. , p. E.
 Mike Bowen, ‘Purging the Right: moderate Republicans and party factionalism in the
s’, paper presented at the st meeting of the American Historical Association, Atlanta,
GA, – Jan. .  Newsweek,  Apr. , pp. –.
 ‘Kiplinger Washington letter’,  July , Stephens records, box .
 Notes, n.d., DDEL, James C. Hagerty papers, box .
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in . Four years later, at the close of the Eisenhower years, Walter
N. Thayer, another Citizens leader, concluded that ‘the Republican Party, for
whatever reason, during the past eight years has not found the way to avail itself
of the energy and enthusiasm these people have to offer’.
Amateur motivation did not easily support an integration project. ‘You can’t
simply tell the Citizens to “go into the Republican Party”’, Peter Clayton wrote
insightfully in early . ‘If they were all equipped to gently go there, there
would have been no need for them in the ﬁrst place.’ As Sherman Adams,
White House chief of staff, observed, the transformation of the RNC was
possible ‘only through the heroic efforts of a sufﬁcient number of volunteers
working effectively together, who are resolutely determined to obtain results’.
This was a condition that was never met. Another problem, noted by
Eisenhower himself on the basis of work by his political aides, was ‘that it is
impossible to sustain political interest by amateurs throughout the period from
election to election – that it is far more proﬁtable to rekindle the ﬂame than to
keep it burning!’ Their experience in leading Citizens operations encouraged
Valley Knudsen and Henriette Cowgill to determine that this kind of activist was
prepared to ‘come in on a Crusade for a Candidate or on an issue and work
hard for a short time but wanted to be relieved of any Party organization
responsibility’. Recognizing the lack of allure for Citizens activists of party
activism, leaders sometimes softened the call for integration by suggesting
generalized, non-partisan political activity as an alternative outlet for their post-
Citizens interests in politics – therefore also softening the potential of Citizens
to reshape the party. Even more pessimistic about the durability and stability
of amateur endeavour, Ohio party workers did not believe that it was possible to
sustain engagement among Citizens activists in intense campaigning for more
than ten days. Moreover, despite the White House’s interest in encouraging
Citizens activists to join the Republican party and in looking for Eisenhower
supporters as nominees to appointive ofﬁce, leading members of Citizens
complained of neglect – that too few Citizens won appointment to the
administration.
 Larmon to Clay, Hobby, Kilpatrick, Roberts, Stephens, Weinberg, July , Stephens
records, box .
 Thayer to Nixon,  Dec. , Thayer papers, political ﬁles, box .
 Clayton to Pyle,  Jan. , Dwight D. Eisenhower Records as President: White House
Central Files, Ofﬁcial ﬁle, box .
 Adams to Hoffman,  Nov. , Dwight D. Eisenhower Records as President: White
House Central Files, Ofﬁcial ﬁle, box .
 Eisenhower to Baker and Baker,  Aug. , DDEPP, DDE Diary series, box .
 Knudsen and Cowgill to Nixon,  Nov. , Nixon papers, series , box .
 Williams to Citizens members,  Dec. , Nixon papers, series , box .
 Clayton to Stephens,  Oct. , Nixon papers, series , box .
 Roberts to Eisenhower,  Jan. , DDEPP, Name series, box ; NYT,  May ,
p. .
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The desire to change the Republican party via the Citizens organization
therefore confronted the key problem that many Citizens activists lacked
motivation to support the Republican cause, as opposed to the Eisenhower
cause. This problem, crucially signiﬁcant to the fortunes of the goal to
transform the party, ﬁrst became sharply evident during the  midterm
campaign. It had been the perception of the Republican party’s enduring
weakness in mobilizing support beyond the loyally partisan that had
encouraged the establishment of a new Citizens committee in  – a White
House initiative – seeking unsuccessfully to keep Congress in Republican
hands, deﬁned by this committee as supportive of Eisenhower. This was a
consequential reinterpretation of Citizens’s mission, because in  its leaders
had carefully deﬁned the election of the national ticket alone as their goal; the
campaigns of other Republicans were the responsibility of the regular party.
Now there was an effort to achieve Citizens–party integration by stating that the
Eisenhower cause and the Republican cause were the same. But tensions
between the party and the president had scarred Eisenhower’s ﬁrst years in the
White House, especially on questions of foreign policy. As a result of those
tensions, and in recognition of Eisenhower’s popularity, many Democratic
candidates in  stressed their superior support for the president on
international questions, by comparison with their Republican rivals. Within this
context, the rationale of an Eisenhower-supportive Congress did not prove
weighty enough to facilitate the transfer of enthusiasm for the president to the
party at large. One ofﬁcial concluded that the Citizens congressional
committee was ‘a very expensive instrument that did not achieve its goal’.
The project revealed the ineffectiveness of Citizens when Eisenhower’s fortunes
were not directly at issue. The failure to recreate ‘much of the original 
Citizens support and enthusiasm’ was because ‘a good many former Citizens
felt that the  campaign was too much a “Republican” rather than an
“Eisenhower” type undertaking’, noted two leading members of Citizens.
If the  campaign demonstrated the obstacles to recapturing the initial
enthusiasm of the Citizens movement, there also remained ample evidence of
resistance among party regulars to the newcomers. Sounding out local GOP
opinion in southern California when developing plans for the  campaign,
Murray Chotiner, political adviser to Vice President Richard Nixon, found
mixed views toward the Citizens but generally strong opposition to their
remaining a separate organization. When positively inclined toward Citizens,
 NYT,  Dec. , p. ; NYT,  June , sec. IV, p. ; NYT,  July , p. .
 Williams to Chotiner,  Sept. , Nixon papers, PPS ..
 Mason, Republican party, p. .
 Clayton to Thayer,  Mar. , Nixon papers, series , box .
 Lawrence,  Jan. , Dwight D. Eisenhower Records as President: White House Central
Files, Ofﬁcial ﬁle, box .
 Lamb and Clayton to Kilpatrick,  Feb. , Stephens records, box ; diary entry,
 Mar. , DDEPP, Ann Whitman Diary series, box .
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Republican activists saw their role as subsidiary and supportive. This was thus
different from the view among Citizens activists, who saw their organization as
much more important.
The elections of  were then a crucial moment for the Eisenhower
project of party revitalization, an opportunity for Eisenhower amateurs and
Republican professionals to work together in search of a common goal. The
White House developed plans that aimed to maintain amateur enthusiasm
while avoiding factional conﬂict. The framework for the reactivated Citizens
movement included institutional mechanisms that sought to preserve the
independence of Citizens but to include personnel, at the state and local levels,
supportive of work for Republican congressional candidates as well as for
Eisenhower. The formula was awkward, not least because the strategy
underlying the television campaign run by Citizens rejected references to
the party –much less popular than the president – in favour of fostering
‘an emotional preference for Eisenhower and his principles, for Eisenhower the
great leader, the great human being’.
Testifying to a further difﬁculty pertaining to integration, Republican leaders
generally stressed the straightforwardly organizational contribution of Citizens
ahead of all else. National chair Leonard Hall later praised the effectiveness
of Citizens for Eisenhower ‘in doing the political chores of a campaign – the
doorbell-ringing, baby-sitting, poll-watching, fund-raising activities that take
hundreds of hours in every campaign’. This observation reﬂected deep-seated
concern that the GOP was trapped in minority status because its activist base
was neither large enough to ﬁght a campaign effectively, nor strong enough to
identify all Republican supporters and then to bring them to the polls on
election day. In reality, however, polling data suggest that no organizational
disparity divided the parties and indicate that Republican efforts often reached
more voters during campaigns than did Democratic efforts. Nevertheless,
concern about the party’s lack of organizational capacity increased, rather than
decreased, during the s, especially because of alarm among Republicans
about what they saw as the political power of organized labour in support of
their Democratic rivals. In emphasizing Citizens as a group of activists ready to
do organizational work supportive of the party, Hall identiﬁed a potential
counter-strategy in response to this putative labour power, but challenged their
self-deﬁnition as engaged in a different form of politics. This perhaps fostered
regulars’ acceptance of the Citizens newcomers, but it also undermined the
organization’s crusade-like rationale.
 ‘Stockton – –’, ‘Fresno – –’, ‘Bakersﬁeld, –’, ‘LA – –’, ‘Santa Rosa, –’,
‘Sacramento, th Sept’, Nixon papers, PPS ...
 Lamb and Clayton to Kilpatrick,  Feb. , Stephens records, box ; diary entry,
 Mar. , DDEPP, Ann Whitman Diary series, box .
 Young & Rubicam, Inc.,  Sept. , Stephens records, box .
 Hall, foreword, in Mitchell, Elm Street politics, p. i.
 Charles O. Jones, The Republican party in American politics (New York, NY, ), p. .
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Nevertheless, the  effort to harness Citizens activism in support of the
party as well as the president achieved a certain success, at least according to the
analysis of Citizens operatives. Their generally buoyant ﬁeld reports often noted
both good Citizens–party relations and effective organizational work being
undertaken by Citizens. The cost of such harmony, however, was the
distinctiveness of the Citizens operation: ‘it was difﬁcult on many occasions to
maintain a true Citizens character to our activities’, concluded William
M. Robbins of Citizens. In Vermont, a state in which the Republican party
was especially strong, there was ‘little to distinguish between the Citizens activity
and the regular-line Republican organization’. The Connecticut chair of
Citizens, Ted Ryan, was a Republican state senator seeking re-election;
consequently, ‘liason [sic] between Citizens and the State Republican
Organization is very strong’, it was noted. Similarly, Citizens in Oregon
‘[was] very closely coordinated with the Republican Party Organization, sharing
headquarters in an unused theater in downtown Portland’, reported Betsy
Taubman. At the centre, Citizens ofﬁcials judged the Oregon organization as
excellent, because of an energetic programme of campaigning and because of
this harmonious relationship with the regular party. But from the perspective
of amateur endeavour, the result of such co-ordination was negative. According
to Edgar Eisenhower, the president’s brother, state-level Citizens support for
the organization in his home area of Pierce County, Oregon, was under the
control of a Republican organization that was unsympathetic to the Citizens
project. With regard to winning over independents and disaffected Democrats,
he concluded, ‘we will have a great deal of difﬁculty if the organization is tainted
with Republicanism’.
Overall, therefore, in  Citizens achieved organizational effectiveness in
many states, usually avoiding tensions with the local Republican party, but at
the cost of its distinctive amateurism. Meanwhile, at the elite level, Citizens
efﬁciently raised funds and oversaw a successful television operation, run by
Young & Rubicam’s Sigurd Larmon. But what these organizational successes
might lead to was unclear. Peter Clayton, who ran the ﬁeld operation,
concluded that ‘to the extent that we have made it possible for many of these
people to translate their newly found political interests and enthusiasms
into work within the Republican Party . . . we have materially succeeded’.
The question remained an open one, however. Moreover, attributing the
 State ﬁeld reports,  and  Oct. , Stephens records, box . See also Clayton,
‘National Citizens for Eisenhower-Nixon: Field Organization Department: summary report,
’, Pyle records, box .
 Robbins, ‘National Citizens for Eisenhower-Nixon: Vice-Chairman’s Ofﬁce: summary
report, ’, Pyle records, box .
 Robbins, reports,  Sept. and  Oct. , Stephens records, box .
 Taubman, report, Sept. , Stephens records, box .
 Clayton to Stephens,  Oct. , Nixon papers, series , box .
 Eisenhower to Eisenhower,  Sept. , DDEPP, DDE Diary Series, box .
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movement’s success to its function as an outlet for those outside the Republican
party, Citizens chair John Reed Kilpatrick did not see clearly how to take the
organization forward. Furthermore, despite the stress on harmony between
Citizens and the party, resistance to newcomers remained. ‘I have almost lost my
Republican rating’, wrote Dorothy Houghton, after running the Citizens
women’s division in , even though she had a long record of party service
before taking on that assignment.
Beyond organizational matters, the larger impact of Citizens in  was
less successful. The deﬁnitive contemporary academic account of the 
campaign does not mention the Citizens movement at all. Its reactivation
in support of Eisenhower’s re-election did not recreate the  spirit. In
challenging the distinctiveness of Citizens, the quest for amateur–professional
harmony stripped away the sense of a crusade. The crusade-like spirit was
difﬁcult anyway to recreate; one of the problems that the Citizens movement
faced after  was that its founding mission no longer had the same sense of
urgency now that Eisenhower was in the White House.
Just as the disappointments of  increased the White House’s commit-
ment to an integration project, the shortcomings of  – when Eisenhower
achieved re-election by a landslide but the Republican party remained the
minority in both the House and the Senate – spurred renewed interest in the
potential of Citizens to transform the party. Eisenhower announced that his re-
election victory marked a mandate for his agenda but added that ‘the United
States has not yet been convinced that modern Republicanism is with us and is
going to be the guiding philosophy of the Republican party’, implicitly
suggesting that action in this regard was necessary. There was some appetite
among Citizens leaders to go back on a crusade against factional enemies within
the party. Peter Clayton, for example, advocated a sharper-edged use of Citizens
to oppose the re-nomination of Senate Republicans unfriendly to Eisenhower,
notably Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin and William Jenner of Indiana, and to
encourage the emergence of younger, better candidates within the party.
‘I can think of nothing more proper than the rebuilding of the Republican
Party along the very democratic lines along which parties are meant to be built’,
wrote Clayton in December . ‘The Citizens of many states are well qualiﬁed
 Clayton, ‘National Citizens for Eisenhower-Nixon: Field Organization Department:
summary report, ’, Pyle records, box ; Kilpatrick and Burn, ‘National Citizens for
Eisenhower-Nixon: Chairman’s Ofﬁce: summary report, ’, Pyle records, box .
 Houghton to Nixon,  Apr. , Nixon papers, series , box .
 Charles A. H. Thomson and Frances M. Shattuck, The  presidential campaign
(Washington, DC, ).  Bone, Party committees and national politics, p. .
 Dick, Volunteers, pp. –.
 Beaver Valley (PA) Times,  May , p. ; NYT,  Nov. , p. .
 Clayton to Adams,  Dec. , Dwight D. Eisenhower Records as President: White
House Central Files, Ofﬁcial ﬁle, box .
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to lead the ﬁght for the kind of candidates that they think most clearly
identiﬁable with the Eisenhower leadership.’
As party leader, however, the president could not endorse such a divisive
campaign. In his memoirs, Eisenhower noted that in  he used the
promise of organizational support from Citizens for Eisenhower to encourage
Joseph Meek, the party’s Senate candidate in Illinois, to quiet his criticisms of
the administration’s foreign policy and his support for Joseph McCarthy.
However, the incident offers a reminder that the president’s power as party
leader is limited; such one-off, low-proﬁle, and small successes do not add up to
the larger-scale transformation of the party that Eisenhower sought. Nor does it
suggest either a capacity or a willingness to embark on the more aggressive
approach that Clayton advocated, which recalled Franklin Roosevelt’s failed
‘purge’ effort against conservative Democrats in .
I V
Eisenhower’s challenge to Meek’s conservatism indicates his desire to use
Citizens to promote his vision of the Republican party, one that involved its turn
in the direction of moderation – the goal of modern Republicanism. To some
activists, the appeal of Citizens was the opportunity to garner support for this
moderate version of the Republican party; the recruitment of Citizens activists
to the Republican party promised to infuse the party with Eisenhower’s modern
Republicanism. As Representative Jacob K. Javits of New York put it to
Eisenhower, their permanent recruitment to party ranks offered the prospect
of party transformation because ‘the indefatigable worker is rarely to be
denied’. For many of the leading ﬁgures in Citizens, the personal dimension
of the project was important. Henry Cabot Lodge told Eisenhower, after the
 elections, that the party ‘should as speedily as possible make itself over
into your image’ in order to ‘become the majority party in America’. Also in
response to the disappointments of , Walter Williams of Citizens under-
lined the imperative ‘to sell better than ever before the idea of tying the “image
of Eisenhower” to the Republican Party’. Paul Hoffman, another Citizens
leader, emphasized ‘the image of Eisenhower’ as the essential characteristic for
a revitalized party.
 Clayton to Kilpatrick,  Dec. , Dwight D. Eisenhower Records as President: White
House Central Files, Ofﬁcial ﬁle, box .  Mason, Republican party, ch. .
 Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House years: mandate for change, – (Garden City,
NY, ), p. .
 Javits to Eisenhower,  Dec. , Special Collections, Frank Melville, Jr, Memorial
Library, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, New York, Jacob K. Javits collection, series ,
sub-series , box .  Bowen, Roots of modern conservatism, p. .
 Lodge to Eisenhower,  Nov. , DDEPP, Administration series, box .
 Williams to Eisenhower,  Nov. , DDEPP, Ofﬁcial ﬁles, box .
 Eisenhower to Hoffman,  Jan. , DDEPP, Administration series, box .
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It is important to qualify the contribution of the Citizens movement to the
moderate cause, however. Citizens was by no means straightforwardly in favour
of the modern-Republican project. The organization had special responsibility
for the mobilization of Eisenhower support in the South, where a non-partisan
emphasis was clearly much more promising than any Republican identity.
(The label in  was sometimes Citizens and sometimes Democrats for
Eisenhower; in , the national organization promoted the latter label.)
These efforts often sought conservative, even segregationist, support. In ,
Donald Richberg, who had chaired the National Recovery Administration
during the early New Deal years, campaigned as a leading Democrat for
Eisenhower in Virginia, placing special emphasis on attacking the Truman
administration for its liberalism on race, its disregard for states’ rights. In
Greensboro, North Carolina, during the same campaign, Citizens distributed
leaﬂets that were more assertively segregationist in tone. Four years later in
Memphis, Citizens used the Confederate battle ﬂag in pamphlets designed
to woo segregationist sentiment. In the South, therefore, Citizens aimed to
foster Eisenhower activism, to reach out to voters who did not normally support
the Republican party. But Citizens did not promote moderation within the
Republican party, instead even aligning the party with segregationists.
Even at the national level, the message of Citizens for Eisenhower was
sometimes not so moderate. In , in soliciting funds for Citizens,
Peter Clayton emphasized opposition to ‘creeping Socialism’ – a rallying cry
among conservative Republicans – as a cause that united Citizens and regular
Republicans, calling the alternative to Republican victory in  ‘terrify-
ing’. By , the idea of an Eisenhower crusade was no longer visible in
Citizens rhetoric; by then, the national organization stressed a conservative
message, little different from that of mainstream Republicans. Lloyd
MacMahon, who led Citizens in , sought to mobilize activists by warning
of the Democrats’ drift to socialism and by promoting, by contrast, the virtues of
free enterprise. This rhetoric was nevertheless consistent with Eisenhower’s
own message at this time, which posited a ‘critical choice’ between ‘spendthrift
 NYT,  Aug. , p. .
 Adamy to Hall,  Mar. , DDEL, Republican National Committee Ofﬁce of the
Chairman (Leonard W. Hall) records, box .
 Richberg,  Oct. , Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC,
Donald R. Richberg papers, box .
 Julian M. Pleasants, ‘“Call your next case”: H. F. “Chub” Seawell Jr., the gubernatorial
election of , and the rise of the Republican party in North Carolina’, North Carolina
Historical Review,  (), p. .
 G. Wayne Dowdy, Crusades for freedom: Memphis and the political transformation of the
American South (Jackson, MS, ), p. .
 Clayton to Citizens supporters,  May , Stephens records, box .
 MacMahon to Citizens activists,  Oct. , Dwight D. Eisenhower Records as
President: White House Central Files, Ofﬁcial ﬁle, box ; see also, for example, ‘Advance’,
 Oct. , Nixon papers, series , box .
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government [and] responsible government’ in ; a severe economic
downturn had encouraged the administration to stress ﬁscal conservatism
rather than policy innovation, thus shedding the gloss of modern
Republicanism.
Citizens activists, moreover, were not uniformly in the moderate camp. One
of their South Carolina leaders, Micah Jenkins, managed his county’s 
write-in campaign to return segregationist Strom Thurmond to the Senate and
later promoted the Republican party as a conservative force in his state.
In Arizona, Citizens leader Stephen Shadegg ran Barry Goldwater’s  and
 Senate campaigns and became a key ﬁgure in his  presidential
campaign that renounced the modern-Republican inheritance.
That Citizens still existed as late as  starkly indicated its failure to
transform the Republican party, though this longevity also underlined its
organizational power. The institutional continuity that Citizens for Eisenhower
achieved after  showed that it had not adequately acted as a conduit for
the mobilization of new activists and then as an agent for the promotion of
modern Republicanism. Citizens leaders recognized that, though some activists
may have joined Republican ranks, many were reluctant to do so, and that their
organization’s continued existence was necessary to maintain an adequate
appeal to the independent voter. In the recession-blighted midterm
campaign of , the movement experienced still more problems. By late
August, the organization had raised only $,, compared with $, at
the same stage four years earlier. ‘Regular GOP leaders, . . . while expressing
gratiﬁcation at its fast-vanishing power, would prefer to witness its complete
burial’, reported the conservative Human Events. This publication fretted that
factional plans such as those outlined by Clayton might become real, that
Citizens leaders might use the organization’s wealth to oppose Eisenhower’s
intraparty foes. But Citizens no longer had any wealth; when Senator Hugh
Scott of Pennsylvania, a moderate, requested ﬁnancial assistance, he was
told that the organization had no funds to give. Indeed, Citizens leaders
in California discovered that it was the conservative ‘right-to-work’ cause in
opposition to labour rights that absorbed business contributions, suggestive of
the moderates’ accumulating difﬁculties and the conservatives’ developing
 Iwan W. Morgan, Eisenhower versus ‘the spenders’: the Eisenhower administration, the Democrats
and the budget, – (London, ), pp. – (quotation, p. ). Eisenhower even
grumbled about the reluctance of congressional Republicans to stress adequately the issue of
spending: ‘Seemingly the disease of Congressional spending is not taken very seriously by
candidates for the Congress’, he wrote. Eisenhower to Burns,  Sept. , DDEPP, DDE
Diary series, box .  Human Events,  May , p. .
 Jason Crabtree LaBau, ‘Phoenix rising: Arizona and the origins of modern conservative
politics’ (Ph.D. dissertation, Southern California, ), pp. –, .
 Houghton to Nixon,  Apr. , Nixon papers, series , box .
 Roberts to Eisenhower,  Aug. , DDEPP, Name series, box .
 Human Events,  Aug. , News section, pp. –.
 McWhorter to Nixon,  Sept. , Nixon papers, series , box .
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ascendance. The campaign of , moreover, would provide clear evidence
that the professionals’ vision of amateurs as a subsidiary, supportive group of
organizational workers had achieved a larger victory. In that year, Volunteers
for Nixon-Lodge aimed to recreate Citizens in support of the national ticket;
mindful of the criticisms that Citizens had encountered, however, those in
charge of the Nixon campaign emphasized that Volunteers would disband after
the election.
The Citizens movement therefore faltered as a way to revitalize the activist
ranks of the Republican party, as did its moderating agenda. Despite the
factional advances of the mid-s, there was no larger victory for modern
Republicanism. This setback for moderation, in turn, was likely to reinforce the
Republican party’s lack of appeal to these potential new recruits. It is true that
in some respects the Eisenhower administration transformed the policy agenda
of the Republican party. In  and , congressional Republicans
decisively shifted away from the anti-internationalism that had been important
in encouraging Eisenhower to challenge Taft for the  presidential
nomination. A similar change was visible among the party’s supporters
within the electorate, who were much more likely than before to approve of
Cold War bipartisanship. These successes were signiﬁcant in checking the
party’s isolationist inheritance that especially offended Eisenhower, but larger
progress towards modern Republicanism was less signiﬁcant. Congressional
Republicans as a whole did turn modestly more moderate during the s, but
this was not enough to secure the enactment of Eisenhower’s middle-way
agenda, which usually fell victim to a formidable combination of both liberal
and conservative opposition.During Eisenhower’s second term, even though
it began with a pledge of commitment to modern Republicanism, the pursuit
of this moderate agenda also fell victim to the economic downturn. The
administration’s response to the recession placed an emphasis on cautious
conservatism, rather than any programmatic advances. The lacklustre impact
of Citizens within the party’s activist ranks by no means had the key
responsibility for the disappointing fortunes of modern Republicanism. But it
does reveal the hollowness of the high hopes that party moderates invested in
what they saw as the promise of Citizens.
 Knudsen to Nixon,  Aug. , Nixon papers, series , box .
 Salt Lake Tribune,  Aug. , p. ; Time,  Nov. .
 Gary W. Reichard, The reafﬁrmation of Republicanism: Eisenhower and the eighty-third Congress
(Knoxville, TN, ), pp. –; Pickett, Eisenhower decides to run, pp. –.
 Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, The
American voter (New York, NY, ), p. .
 Kevin S. Price, ‘The partisan legacies of preemptive leadership: assessing the Eisenhower
cohorts in the U. S. House’, Political Research Quarterly,  (), pp. –; Wagner,
Eisenhower Republicanism.  Morgan, Eisenhower versus ‘the spenders’, pp. –.
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More importantly, developments were at work in the party not in support of
modern Republicanism, but decisively in opposition. Examples of such
opposition could be found on the Lincoln Day following Eisenhower’s 
landslide, when Eisenhower had tried to deﬁne that landslide as a victory for
modern Republicanism. Many Lincoln Day speeches discussed modern
Republicanism, but some of them challenged prevailing understandings of
the term. Representative Richard M. Simpson of Pennsylvania, chair of the
Republican Congressional Campaign Committee, commented, for example,
‘The Modern Republicanism in which I believe is the Republicanism of Lincoln
and Taft.’ An RNC survey in  of party leaders in the Midwest revealed,
overall, an insistence that conservatism, rather than moderation, was necessary
to improve party prospects. Asked how to strengthen the party’s electoral
prospects, one respondent wrote, ‘Get rid of Modern Republicans.’ According
to another, asked for comments on the president, ‘I voted for a Republican and
got a New Dealer!’ Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona was emerging as a
leader of this new conservatism. Goldwater won election to the Senate in 
as an Eisenhower Republican, but modern Republicanism disappointed him
and encouraged him to become an advocate of conservatism instead. His belief
in the electoral promise of conservatism involved in part the insight, supported
by his experience of Arizona campaigning, that staunch opposition to New Deal
liberalism energized activists; their work at the grassroots helped to bring
victory. That insight was opposite to that informing the Citizens project,
which insisted that moderation and not conservatism impelled the kind of
activism likely to bring victory for the party.
V
Eisenhower’s departure from the White House did not end the Citizens project,
however beleaguered by that point. The movement instead met a different end,
one of factional ignominy. In the early s, conservatism was ﬁrmly on
the march within the Republican party, and a group of leading Eisenhower
supporters tried to resuscitate the organization in  as the National
Republican Citizens Committee. Eisenhower praised the effort ‘to recruit to
the Republican cause and to retain a spark of life in the old Citizens’ groups
of , ’ and ’’, thus boosting the party. Again, the goal was the
recruitment of Eisenhower activists and now Nixon activists for the Republican
 Mary C. Brennan, Turning Right in the sixties: the conservative capture of the GOP (Chapel
Hill, NC, ).  Gettysburg (PA) Times,  Feb. , p. .
 Guylay to Alcorn,  May , Pyle records, box .
 Goldwater to Javits,  May , Javits collection, series , sub-series , box .
 It was later renamed the Republican Citizens Committee of the United States.
 Eisenhower to Thayer,  Feb. , Thayer papers, political ﬁles, box .
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party. The Citizens leaders argued that organizational revitalization was
not enough to boost the party’s fortunes; there was a need, too, for policy
development, so Milton Eisenhower, the president’s brother, launched a
research offshoot, the Critical Issues Council. Conservatives attacked the
return of the Citizens movement. According to Katharine Kennedy Brown,
an Ohio member of the RNC, the re-launch was a left-wing effort to take over
the party. Barry Goldwater said that its leaders were ‘the same people who
caused most of our present Party troubles’ – for side-lining Republican regulars,
for downplaying Republican principles during the Eisenhower adminis-
tration. The conservatives were right to see the re-launch as an effort to
promote moderation within the party. But they had nothing to fear. It was not
long before the organization dissolved into irrelevance. The new Citizens
operation inherited a mailing list of , names, but by summer  it had
fewer than  members. The Critical Issues Council had little success, too.
Unable to mobilize moderation, what was now called the Republican Citizens
Committee simply offered, in the name of unity, its rather meagre resources to
the party’s presidential campaign when Goldwater won the nomination.
In , after the Goldwater defeat, a ﬁnal effort to bring the movement back
to life collapsed, lacking both supporters and money. This iteration of
the Citizens movement did not have mass support; it relied on the elite strand
of Eisenhower associates and Citizens leaders – not enough to exercise any
meaningful inﬂuence on the development of the Republican party. The ﬁnal
paradox of Citizens, therefore, is that what began with the belief that grassroots
enthusiasm could turn the party toward election-winning moderation, drawing
on the energies of large numbers of activists, ended with an elite challenge to
amateur endeavour among Republicans.
The factional ignominy that surrounded the decline of Citizens for
Eisenhower sharply revealed the shortcomings of the vision that this
candidate-centred organization might transform the party at large thanks
to an infusion of Eisenhower activists. Many of these Eisenhower activists
showed little inclination to become Republican activists, to promote modern
Republicanism. In such ways, these amateur Republicans shared what Wilson
 Tobin, Jr, to Thayer,  June , Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington,
DC, William Saﬁre papers, box .
 ‘Republican Citizens Committee of the United States: Progress Report #’, June ,
Thayer papers, political ﬁles, box ; ‘Republican Citizens Committee of the United States
Progress Report’, Oct. , ‘Political Files National Republican Citizens Committee ’,
Thayer papers, political ﬁles, box .  Brennan, Turning Right in the sixties, pp. –.
 Brown to Miller,  July , Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington,
DC, William A. Rusher papers, box .
 Goldwater to Miller,  July , Arizona Historical Foundation, Hayden Library,
Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona, Barry Goldwater papers, series P&P I, box .
 Von Stade to Shefﬁeld and Thayer,  Aug. , Thayer papers, political ﬁle, box .
 Thayer to Goldwater,  Aug. , Thayer papers, political ﬁle, box .
 Rees to Thayer,  Nov. , Thayer papers, political ﬁle, box .
C I T I Z E N S F O R E I S E N HOW E R ,  –
saw as the shortcomings of his amateur Democrats; they were unwilling to move
beyond their narrower cause in support of a wider party agenda. Furthermore,
the involvement of a Citizens elite in the struggle against Goldwater activism
underlines the wrong-headed nature of the assumption that amateur endeavour
within the Republican party was consistent with any quest for moderation.
Eisenhower activists were often reluctant to become Republican activists;
existing Republicans were often unwilling to accept their arrival except, at best,
as ideologically neutral contributors of organizational muscle. The bold
ambition to transform the party was misplaced. In his memoirs, Eisenhower
concluded that he achieved only ‘slight’ success in pursuing his goal ‘to unify,
and strengthen the Republican Party’. In time, the amateur tendency in
which he invested conﬁdence helped not to consolidate his vision of modern
Republicanism, but instead to inform conservative opposition to that vision.
The next generation of Republican amateurs would support Barry Goldwater
and a very different vision for the party’s future, one that would prove to have
much more signiﬁcance in the longer term.
 Wagner, Eisenhower Republicanism, p. .
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